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ACTIONS: NONE INFO: NIO/WE, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OOE/ASZ,
OSA/CS/CF, OSA/CS/EN, OSA/CS/EP, OSA/CS/X, OSA/PA, OSA/PA/F, OSA/PA/S,
PLANFAC-E (), WED/SA, FILE, RF, UPA/II, O/UCR-3, OSD/DEB, EUR-3,
IAD/CAS-3, IAD/SSO, ICS/HTO, NED, NED/NPB, NED/NWB, NFAC/ACIS, NICAG/ST,
NIO/GPF, OER-3, OSWR-2, OSWR/CIG: (27/W)

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3.1/27/81 (GREY, R.) ACDA/D

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: INF INSTRUCTIONS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE US DELEGATION FOR THE INITIAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF), BEGINNING NOVEMBER 30, 1981.
3. THE PRIMARY US OBJECTIVES FOR THIS ROUND ARE:
 - TO MAKE CLEAR THE US APPROACH TO INF ARMS CONTROL: NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOCUS FIRST ON LAND-BASED INF MISSILES; THE US IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SUBSEQUENT LIMITS, WITH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, FOR OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS;
 - TO MAKE CLEAR THE ASYMMETRY OF EXISTING INF FORCES FAVORING THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF ANY AGREEMENT THAT PRESERVES THIS ASYMMETRY;
 - TO PROPOSE AN INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ELIMINATE THE SS-20, SS-4, AND SS-5 IN RETURN FOR NON-DEPLOYMENT OF

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State Dept. review completed

ATTACHMEN

Form 163a
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THE PERSHING II AND BGM-109G, AND PLACE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT;

-- TO OBTAIN A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET APPROACH.

4. IF THE SUBJECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS ARISES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT THE US VIEWS THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL US-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE, AS WELL AS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS THAT WE EXPECT WILL BEGIN IN 1982, BUT SHOULD NOT ELABORATE FURTHER.

5. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR US VIEWS ON THE SECURITY CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH INF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ARE PROCEEDING:

-- SOVIET INF DEPLOYMENTS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE SERIOUSLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE BALANCE AND THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE;

-- THE NUMERICAL BALANCE IN INF FORCES SHOWS A SHARP SOVIET ADVANTAGE WHEN LIKE FORCES ARE COMPARED;

-- IN RESPONSE, THE US HAS INITIATED ITS OWN INF PROGRAMS -- BGM-109G AND PERSHING II -- AND IS PURSUING THEM VIGOROUSLY;

-- AT THE SAME TIME, THE US IS READY TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON INF, AND IS PREPARED TO CONCLUDE AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE DISMANTLING OF SS-20S, SS-4S, AND SS-5S, IN EXCHANGE FOR THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND BGM-109G;

-- ANY INF AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS.

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6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT:

-- THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO SEEK LIMITS ON LAND-BASED INF MISSILES;

-- THE US IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SUBSEQUENT LIMITS, WITH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, FOR OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS.

7. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US WILL NOT NEGOTIATE ON AIRCRAFT ISSUES. DELEGATION SHOULD ARGUE THAT BOTH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AIRCRAFT AND THEIR CONVENTIONAL ROLES MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO COMPARE THEM WITH INF MISSILES, AND THAT THEIR INCLUSION IN A FIRST PHASE WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS MORE COMPLEX, DISTRACTING FROM THE GOAL OF TIMELY AND MEANINGFUL LIMITS ON MISSILES. THE DELEGATION SHOULD REFUTE SOVIET CLAIMS ON THE INF BALANCE WHICH RELY ON AIRCRAFT DATA.

8. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE SEA-BASED SYSTEMS AS A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION IN INF, THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THESE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE INCLUDED. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON SLCM EITHER IN INF OR IN START.

9. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THESE ARE BILATERAL TALKS AND SUCH FORCES ARE NOT AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH FORCES WILL NOT BE INCLUDED OR COMPENSATED FOR IN ANY AGREEMENT, AND CANNOT BE USED TO JUSTIFY UNEQUAL LIMITS ON US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD REJECT SOVIET CLAIMS THAT ALLIED SYSTEMS SHOULD BE COUNTED IN THE BALANCE, AND SHOULD OFFER NO DATA ON NUMBERS OR CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLIED SYSTEMS.

10. THE DELEGATION SHOULD SET FORTH GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT: EQUALITY OF LIMITS AND RIGHTS; LIMITS ON COVERED SYSTEMS WHEREVER LOCATED; WARHEADS AS THE MOST ACCURATE MEASURE OF DESTRUCTIVE

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POTENTIAL; ASSURANCE OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING COOPERATIVE MEASURES GOING BEYOND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WHERE NECESSARY; AND EXCHANGE OF DATA ON SYSTEMS COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THESE PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN THE CONTEXT OF REINFORCING OUR PROPOSAL, AND MUST NOT IMPLY THAT THEY CONSTITUTE AN ALTERNATIVE.

11. DELEGATION SHOULD DEVELOP DATA TO REBUT SOVIET ARGUMENTS ON THE BALANCE AND PROVIDE IT TO WASHINGTON FOR APPROVAL. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON DATA WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE DELEGATION. IN ADDITION, THE DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THE AGREEMENT INCLUDE AN AGREED DATA BASE ON THE SYSTEMS COVERED.

12. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE A PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

--DISMANTLING OF THE SS-20, SS-4, AND THE SS-5 ON THE SOVIET SIDE, AND NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THE BGM-109G AND PERSHING II ON THE US SIDE;

--WASHINGTON WILL PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON HOW FUTURE MISSILES WILL BE HANDLED;

--THE BAN WOULD INCLUDE ALL SUCH SYSTEMS WHEREVER LOCATED;

--DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING MISSILES, LAUNCHERS, AND SUPPORT FACILITIES WOULD BE CARRIED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR ACCORDING TO PROCEDURES TO BE AGREED IN THE SCC;

--IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS WILL APPLY TO THE SS-12, SS-22, AND SS-23. SUCH NECESSARY CONSTRAINTS INCLUDE LIMITS ON THE NUMBERS OF SUCH SYSTEMS, INCLUDING REFIRE MISSILES; RANGE UPGRADE; AND FRACTIONATION. THE US WILL PRESENT

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PROPOSALS FOR SUCH CONSTRAINTS AS THE NEGOTIATIONS
PROGRESS:

--THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT COOPERATIVE
MEASURES TO AID VERIFICATION GOING BEYOND NTM MAY BE
REQUIRED. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES WILL
BE FORTHCOMING AT A LATER TIME;

--THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OF INDEFINITE DURATION,
WITH PROVISION FOR REVIEW EVERY FIVE YEARS;

--THE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE THAT THE STANDING
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WILL BE THE FORUM FOR WORKING
OUT PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT, FOR EX-
CHANGE OF NOTIFICATIONS, AND FOR CONSIDERATION OF
QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS.

THE DELEGATION SHOULD GIVE NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS
TO FALL BACK FROM OUR PROPOSAL THAT CALLS FOR ELIMINA-
TION OF THE SS-20S, SS-4S, AND SS-5, AND OTHER ELEMENTS
OF OUR PROPOSAL.

13. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS
THAT THE US PLANS TO TABLE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL IN THIS
ROUND. THE DELEGATION SHOULD PREPARE A DRAFT TEXT FOR
AN AGREEMENT, AND FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF THE TEXT FROM

WASHINGTON, SHOULD PLAN TO TABLE IT LATER IN THIS
ROUND.

14. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE ISSUES NOT COVERED BY THESE
INSTRUCTIONS, THEY SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON
FOR GUIDANCE.

15. THE DELEGATION SHOULD ADOPT THE POSITION THAT
THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL, BUT
MAKE CLEAR OUR OBLIGATIONS TO KEEP OUR ALLIES AND THE
CONGRESS INFORMED. THE DELEGATION SHOULD AVOID SUB-
STANTIVE PRESS CONTACTS OR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF
THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH LOCAL ALLIED
REPRESENTATIVES.

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16. THE US EXPECTS THIS ROUND WILL LAST ABOUT THREE WEEKS. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE SOVIETS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 1982. HE SHOULD ADVISE THE SOVIETS THAT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, THE US ENVISIONS ROUNDS OF APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS' DURATION, WITH PERIODS BETWEEN ROUNDS FOR CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS, AND SEEK SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE. CLARK

END OF MESSAGE

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